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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW, 1985-1986-PART I
A Faculty Symposium
[Editor's Note: Part II of this symposium, which will appear in the next issue of
this Review, will cover admiralty, insurance, and workers' compensation law.]

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
Glenn G. Morris*

AGENCY

Middleman as Broker or Dealer
When one of the three parties in a supplier-middleman-customer
deal becomes insolvent while still owing performance to one of the other
parties, the nature of the relationship among the three becomes critical.
If the middleman is simply a broker, i.e., an agent for one or both of
the other parties, he Will not be held responsible either to the supplier
or to the customer for the breach of"the other's promise. Each must
look solely to the other principal, and not to the representative in the
middle, for contractual performance. If the middleman is not a broker,
however, but instead a principal who undertakes to buy goods and to
resell them at a profit, then he is the party that must bear the loss
first when either or both sides of his contemplated buy-sell arrangement
do not work out as planned. Similarly, because the supplier and customer
have no contract with each other, but only related contracts with the
dealer, the dealer's failure to perform must be suffered by the aggrieved
party without recourse to the supplier or customer on whose performance
the dealer was relying.
Three different cases last year considered this "broker or dealer"
issue. In two of the cases, middlemen who had normally acted as dealers
tried in connection with the particular transactions involved to have
themselves treated as mere brokers. One was hoping to avoid the con-
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sequences of his supplier's insolvency, while the other was trying to
avoid the effects of his customer's inability to pay. Both efforts failed,
probably as a result of the courts' skepticism toward the middlemen's
claims that the other party really had agreed to modify the normal
approach to the type of transaction involved. In the third case, involving
the loss by a college student of money he had mailed in for a telescope,
the court seemed to lean over backward to find some way to get the
student either the telescope or his money. The first two cases seem
consistent with commercial expectations. The third does not.
In the first "full service" case, Keahey v. Osborne Ford-LincolnMercury, Inc.,' the second circuit held that an automobile dealership
was responsible to its customer for failing to deliver a special-order
replica 1955 Thunderbird. The failure was caused by the bankruptcy of
the manufacturer of the car. At the time of the bankruptcy, the dealership had already paid the manufacturer in full for the car, and had
already been reimbursed by the customer not only for its out of pocket
payments to the manufacturer, but also for $2795 in sales tax, dealer
installed options and dealer preparations. There had been conflicting
testimony at trial concerning the nature of the dealer's role in the
transaction. The appellate court, though, pointed out that the dealership
was making some profit on the car and had undertaken to install certain
options and to "finish up" th6 car before delivery to the plaintiff
customer. This, combined with the testimony of the customer, convinced
the court that the dealership had been acting in its normal dealership
role, and not simply as an agent.
The court rejected all the testimony of the dealership's employees
to the effect that the customer had been warned about dealing with this
manufacturer, and that she had agreed to have the dealership act strictly
as her agent. The court said that the testimony of an agent is not
admissible to prove the existence of an agency relationship against the
principal. 2 This was a misstatement of the law, 3 but it allowed the court
to reverse the trial court's factual finding in favor of the dealership
without having to justify the reversal on grounds of manifest error.4

I. 485 So. 2d 182 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986).
2. Id.at 187.
3. See infra notes 8-19 and accompanying text.
4. The court itself acknowledged the manifest error rule of Arceneaux v. Domingue,
365 So. 2d 1330 (La. 1978), Keahey, 485 So. 2d at 185, but it seemed determined not
to let the trial court's factual finding stand. It not only used an erroneous rule of law
to exclude the purported agent's testimony, see infra notes 8-19 and accompanying text,
but it also strained to avoid the dealership's very sensible suggestion that the real issue
in the case was not whether the contract was one of sale or mandate, or even whether
the contract had contained a thing, price and consent, but simply whether the customer
had agreed to bear the risk of the manufacturer's nonperformance.
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Despite the court's pretended deference to the trial court's findings, it
seemed perfectly willing as a practical matter to overturn the trial court's
finding of agency. This suggests the difficulty likely to arise in convincing
most courts that the parties to a routine type of transaction really have
modified the standard way of approaching the transaction, particularly
where the alleged change works, as it did in Keahey, to the disadvantage
of the less sophisticated, less knowledgeable party.
The difficulty of deviating from normal practice even among businessmen was illustrated in the second "full service dealer" case, Nasco
Equipment Co. v. Briggs-Weaver, Inc.' In that case, the fourth circuit
affirmed a trial court ruling that an equipment dealer was responsible
for the payment for a bulldozer supplied through the dealer to one of
the dealer's customers, but never paid for by the customer. This ruling
was particularly striking, because the supplier had agreed to, and in
fact did, bill the customer rather than the dealer for the bulldozer. This
was done at the dealer's request, supposedly after he had explained to
the supplier that he did not trust the credit of his customer, and so
did not himself want to establish a credit account for him. Still, noted
the court, several other features of the transaction suggested a standard
dealer arrangement. The dealer was to be paid a fee based on the
difference between the retail and wholesale prices for the bulldozer and
was to perform both predelivery services and postdelivery warranty work.
In light of these facts, the court seemed to believe that the billing
arrangement was a trick devised by the dealer to transfer the credit risk
to the supplier, and to doubt that the supplier understood that that was
to be the effect of the dealer's suggested arrangement.
In the "telescope" case, Reeves v. Celestron, Inc., 6 the plaintiff sent
$950 to an Arkansas business described by the court as an authorized
dealer of Celestron brand telescopes. The dealer notified the plaintiff a
couple of months later that it had applied for bankruptcy protection.
The telescope was never delivered. This case posed the reverse of the
issues in the bulldozer and car cases, for here the customer needed to
convince the court that the dealer was really a broker that had acted
on behalf of the still solvent supplier of the telescopes.
Little in the opinion supported a finding that the middleman was
not a dealer. Nevertheless, the court used a rather novel derivative
apparent authority theory7 to say that the dealer might have appeared
to the student's professor to have been a broker, and that the professor's
recommendations might have caused the student to deal with this par-

5. 487 So. 2d 625 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).
6. 473 So. 2d 397 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ rejected as not timely filed, 477 So. 2d
698 (La. 1985).
7. See infra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
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ticular middleman. Under these circumstances, the court said, the producer could be held liable as the apparent principal of the dealer, even
though this was not the actual nature of the relationship between the
two companies.
Restrictions on Testimony of Agents
As mentioned in the preceding section, the second circuit stated in
Keahey that "the testimony of the reputed agent is not admissible to
prove the fact of agency as against the principal." ' This was an erroneous
statement of a similar sounding rule that is widely accepted throughout
the United States. The correct statement of the rule is that the out-ofcourt declarations of authority by a reputed agent are inadmissible
hearsay when introduced to prove the existence of the authority claimed
in the statements. 9 Obviously, this is not a rule of agency law at all,
but simply an application of the hearsay rule in agency cases. It has
nothing to do with the actual testimony of agents. 10
Although the cases cited by Keahey were not careful enough in their
own statements of the rule to make the hearsay rationale clear, all of
them in fact had been dealing either with hearsay" or with statements
not relevant to the issue in the case. 2 Indeed, each of the cases, in
stating the rule, had referred strictly to the "declarations" or "representations" of the purported agent.' 3
Keahey actually quoted the "declarations" language accurately at
first, 4 but then later changed the words of the rule so that it was

8. 485 So. 2d at 187.
9. See, Annot., 80 A.L.R. 604, 604-05; cf., Restatement (Second) of Agency § 285
(1957).
10. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 285 comment a.
II. Livingston Roofing Co. v. Katz, 393 So. 2d 395, 397 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980);
Patrick v. Patrick, 230 So. 2d 759, 762 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
12. Lou-Ark Equip. Rentals Co. v. Hong Ah Fong, 355 So. 2d 1019, 1021 (La.
App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 So. 2d 1167 (La. 1978). Although the court in LouArk did not draw this distinction, the testimony of the agent in Lou-Ark was offered to
prove the existence of apparent, rather than actual, authority. The testimony, therefore,
was not being used as hearsay to prove the truth of the matter asserted (i.e., that authority
actually existed), but rather as evidence that the third party had had reasonable grounds
to believe that the alleged authority existed. This testimony was still excludable, however,
as a principal may be held liable under an apparent authority theory only for the third
party perceptions created by the principal's own conduct or statements. Id. at 1021. Thus,
the unauthorized, unratified statements of a purported agent would normally not be
relevant to the existence of apparent authority. (Statements by the agent showing a lack
of authority would, of course, be relevant to the question of the reasonableness of the
third party's belief.)
13. Livingston, 393 So. 2d at 397; Patrick, 230 So. 2d at 762; Lou-Ark, 355 So. 2d
at 1021. In Patrick, the court did not refer to testimony about the out-of-court declarations,
but that was just another way to state the same, familiar hearsay rule.
14. 485 So. 2d at 185.
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transformed into a prohibition of the agent's actual, nonhearsay testimony. 5 Apparently missing the hearsay connection, Keahey seemed to
view the now-modified rule as a prohibition against self-serving testimony.16 This was an untenable rationale, of course, both because modern
rules of evidence clearly permit self-serving testimony, 7 and because the
court applied its "no self-serving" rule to only one of the two interested

parties.
Keahey involved a straightforward contractual interpretation dispute
between contracting parties. Each claimed that the other had agreed to

bear the risk of the manufacturer's nonperformance.'" There was no
more reason in this case to exclude the testimony of the agent, while

admitting the testimony of the principal, than there would have been
in a sales contract case to exclude the testimony of the seller, while
admitting that of the buyer. 9
In another recent case, American Plumbing Co. v. Hadwin, 0 the
court -followed a rule regarding an agent's testimony which was different
from that utilized in Keahey, but which was equally erroneous. The
court stated the rule as follows: "The special defense of agency cannot

be proved by the mere testimony of the reputed agent. He must be
corroborated by other evidence."'" Thus, the court in American Plumbing did not completely exclude the agent's testimony, as Keahey had,

but rather imposed a corroboration requirement on such testimony as
if it were somehow less credible than the testimony of witnesses who

happened not to be agents.
The plaintiff in American Plumbing was seeking to hold the owner/

agent of a corporation liable on the ground that the owner had failed

15. Id. at 187.
16. Id.
17. Parties to a controversy are considered satisfactory witnesses even for purposes
of La. Civ. Code art. 1846, which requires the testimony of one witness and other
corroborating circumstances to prove contracts whose price or value exceeds $500. See
Dunham v. Dunham, 467 So. 2d 555, 559 (La. App. IstCir.), cert. denied, 469 So.2d
989, 990 (La. 1985); Hurston v. Hurston, 417 So. 2d 407, 408 (La. App. IstCir. 1982);
O'Rourke v. Tracy, 375 So. 2d 747, 748 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
18. The defendant car dealership argued correctly, but unsuccessfully, that however
the contract was classified, as one of mandate or of sale, the parties' actual agreement
on the risk of loss issue should have been decisive, and that the trial court had believed
the defendant's testimony on this point. The court found, however, that this was just
another attempt to have an agent's testimony admitted against the principal, which was
impermissible. 485 So. 2d at 186-87.
19. It was ironic, in fact, that while the court held the contract to have been one
of sale, it still characterized the testimony of the dealership's employees as the statements
of an alleged agent, rather than as the testimony of a seller disputing the buyer's
interpretation of the contract. Id.
20. 483 So. 2d 169 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 486 So. 2d 756 (La. 1986).
21. Id. at 173.
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to disclose to the plaintiff that he had been acting strictly in an agency
capacity when he had contracted with the plaintiff for some remodeling
work. Without such a disclosure, or other factors sufficient to apprise
the third party that the agent was acting in a representative capacity
only, the agent would have been personally liable to the third party for
the performance of the contract.22 Despite the recitation of the corroboration requirement, the plaintiff did not win, as the court found that
there had been sufficient corroboration of the defendant-owner's testimony concerning the disclosure of the agency to the third party.23
As in Keahey, the American Plumbing misstatement may be traced
to language used in earlier cases for entirely different purposes. Ultimately, the source of the corroboration language was an 1899 murder
24
case, State v. Harris,
in which the defendant had offered into evidence
a letter written to the defendant by a purported agent of the prosecution
witnesses. The letter described a proposal allegedly made by the witnesses
to change their testimony in exchange for money. The supreme court
ruled that the refusal of the trial court to admit the letter had been
proper, as the letter was inadmissible hearsay.25 The court noted that,
although the purported author of the letter had been present in the
courtroom during the trial, he had not been called to testify concerning
the letter.
Thus, as in Keahey, the court in American Plumbing was essentially
enforcing a rule that had begun as nothing more than an application
of the hearsay rule in an agency setting. Nothing in Harrishad suggested
that the testimony of agents against either principals or third parties
ought to be corroborated generally. In fact, the agent in Harris had
never testified.
Nevertheless, Harris was cited, gratuitously and erroneously, in support of a general corroboration rule in the 1960 case of De Rouen v.
Aiavolasiti.2 6 In that case, the court simply affirmed a factual finding
that the agent had not disclosed his agency, noting that the agent's own
testimony had failed to establish that he had disclosed the agency to
the third party. In addition, the court cited Harris,and stated that there
was no corroboration of the existence of the agency in the first place.27
De Rouen was cited in Guillory v. Carville,8 and Wilson v. McNabb,2 9
the cases on which the court in American Plumbing specifically relied.
22. Id. at 172; Fernandez v. Miller Richards Aircraft Sales, Inc., 487 So. 2d 660
(La. App. 5th Cir. 1986).
23. 483 So. 2d at 173.
24. 51 La. Ann. 1105, 6 So. 64 (1899).
25. Id.at 1107, 26 So. at 65.
26. 121 So. 2d 851 (La.App. Orl. 1960).
27. Id.at 853.
28. 158 So. 2d 475 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).,
29. 157 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 1stCir. 1963).
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In Wilson, the court did use the corroboration requirement to reverse
a trial court finding that the agent had disclosed his agency status to
the third party. 0 In Guillory, however, the court recited the rule, but
found sufficent corroboration." Neither case was well reasoned with
respect to this issue, for both relied, as did American Plumbing itself,
on a rote recitation of a purported rule that arose originally as a

misconstruction of an application of the hearsay rule in a murder case.
The rule has arisen by accident, has no discernable basis in policy or
legislation, and ought not be followed.
Apparent Authority-Passive and Derivative
The court in Reeves, the telescope case discussed earlier,3 2 adopted
a novel theory of apparent authority in order to treat an insolvent dealer
as a broker, so that its apparent "principal," the supplier, would be

responsible to the customer for the dealer's failure to deliver a telescope.
Apparent authority is strictly a judicial creation; except in connection
with the termination of actual authority," the Civil Code provisions on

mandate reject the concept.' Nevertheless, Louisiana courts have held
that even in the absence of actual authority, a principal will be held
responsible to a third party for the actions of his purported agent if
he has done something to cause the third party reasonably to believe
that the agent was authorized to act as he did on behalf of the principal.',
Although a statement of the apparent authority doctrine contains
more than two distinct concepts,3 6 it is commonly said to consist of two

"elements": (i) acts of the principal [causing] (ii) a reasonable belief

by the third party in the authority of the purported agent.3 7 Reeves
affects both of these elements while ignoring the causal connection
normally required between them.

30. Id. at 899.
31. 158 So. 2d at 476.
32. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
33. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3027 B, 3029, 3032-3033.
34. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3010 (acts of agent beyond authority "null and void
with regard to the principal, unless ratified") and 3021 (principal not bound by acts of
agent beyond agent's authority, "except in so far as he has expressly ratified" them).
35. See, e.g., Radiofone v. Oxford Bldg. Serv., 347 So. 2d 327, 329 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1977); Cast-Crete Corp. v. West Baro Corp., 339 So. 2d 413, 415 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 341 So. 2d 900 (La. 1977).
36. The most obvious example is the concept of causation, linking the acts of the
principal to the perception of the third party. Other distinct concepts would include the
objective reasonableness of and the actual, subjective belief by the third party.
37. See, e.g., AAA Tire & Export, Inc. v. Big Chief Truck Lines, Inc., 385 So. 2d
426, 429 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1980); Bamber Contractors, Inc. v. Morrison Eng'g &
Contracting Co., 385 So. 2d 327, 330 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1980).
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Reeves seems to say that the simple failure by the principal to stop
the agent's manifestations of authority may satisfy the "acts of the
principal" element if it appears that the principal has continued to deal
with the purported agent after becoming aware of his claims of authority.
The supplier in Reeves had tried to get the dealer to stop using ads
that seemed to the supplier to create erroneous impressions of authority.
In the court's view, that was not enough, for if the supplier "was
serious about correcting this impression, ...
the business relationship
should have been terminated." 38
With respect to the "third party belief" element, the court in Reeves
first noted that the plaintiff had not even seen the ads that might have
misled readers about the dealer's authority to bind the supplier. The
court pointed out, however, that the plaintiff's college professor was
the type of person that would probably have seen the ads, and that he
had recommended that the plaintiff purchase the telescope from the
dealer involved. The court then said that in an "esoteric" field such
as telescope sales, the supplier must have anticipated that "ordinary
people" such as the plaintiff would rely on experts, and so held that
"to mislead these experts about an agency relationship is also to mislead
the public, or the plaintiff in this instance, on which he [sic] relied." 39
As mentioned earlier, the court made no effort in its opinion to
establish any causal connection between the purportedly misleading ads
and the plaintiff's purchase. The opinion does not say whether the
misinformation in the ads really influenced the professor's recommendation, or even whether the professor himself had ever seen the ads.
Under these circumstances the result in Reeves seems to suggest that
misinformation in advertising directed, perhaps through "experts," at
the public may be used to establish apparent authority without proof
of causation.
The court did use language unusual enough to allow this case to
be narrowly construed, i.e., to apply only in "esoteric" matters involving
unavoidable reliance on "experts." Nevertheless, the case also provides
the groundwork for a theory of vicarious contractual liability that is
not based on traditional notions of agency law.40
Agent's Tort Duty to Guarantee or Audit Principal's Contract
Compliance
Fryar v. Westside HabilitationCenter,41 purported to deal primarily
with a question of long arm jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in reaching its

38.
39.
40.
41.

473
Id.
See
479

So. 2d at 399.
(emphasis added).
text accompanying supra notes 36-39.
So. 2d 883 (La. 1985).
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result on the jurisdiction issue, the Louisiana Supreme Court said some
shocking things about the duties of agents to third parties in connection
with agent-administered transactions.
Normally, a disclosed agent is not liable personally for the contractual obligations that he handles in a representative capacity on behalf
of his principal.42 The supreme court in Fryar, however, discovered some
tort duties owed by the agent to the third party that could very well
make the agent a guarantor or auditor of the principal's performance.
The agent in Fryarwas an officer of an Oklahoma bank who handled
an eight million dollar investment by a Louisiana depositor in collateralized certificates of deposit of the bank. The bank failed to deliver
the collateral, as agreed, and a couple of months later, the bank itself
failed.
The court reasoned that jurisdiction could be obtained over the bank
officer only if he had personally committed a tort directed toward or
affecting Louisiana residents. In finding that such a tort may have been
committed (depending on the truth of the allegations in the complaint),
the court recited several theories for holding the officer personally liable,
despite his status as an agent.
The court said first that the officer had been "the principal for the
Bank in this transaction. ' 43 Surely, though, the court could not have
meant that the officer was a "principal" in the sense that he, and not
the bank, had been entitled to the profits from the transaction, or that
the bank had been duty-bound to look after his interests in this transaction rather than the other way around. Probably the court meant only
that the officer was the bank's "key" or "principal" representative in
this transaction. However, that alone would not have justified the personal, nonrepresentative responsibilities the court imposed on him.
The court's next statement seemed to be the heart of its analysis.
Irhere, the court said that the officer in this transaction owed certain
uties to the Louisiana depositor: "[HIe had a duty to see that the
ank's obligations were carried out, or, alternatively, a duty to warn
the other party that these obligations were not being carried out. He
ad a duty to deliver the collateral and a duty to warn [the Louisiana
customer's representative]."" The first of these statements of duty is
disjunctive, while the second is conjunctive. It therefore is not clear
hether one or both of the duties is owed. Nor is it clear exactly what
the duties are. The language the court uses seems deliberately vague,
for there was no need to recite a "duty to warn" both specifically in
relation the failure to deliver the collateral, and then again generally

42.
43.
44.

La. Civ. Code arts. 3012-3013.
479 So. 2d at 890.
Id.
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with respect to no particular danger. Further, it was perfectly obvious
to the customer's representative that the collateral had not been delivered
as agreed.4 5 The court must have been talking about some other kind
of warning, then, perhaps that the delivery of the collateral had become
46
critical because the bank was about to fail.
In any case, the duties the court described are not consistent with
basic principles of agency law. 47 If an agent really had a duty to ensure
that his principal performed his contractual obligations, the agent would
essentially be turned into some new kind of guarantor of those obligations. This is at odds with the very idea of representative agency, for
it would make it impossible for an agent to engage in a transaction for
his principal purely as a representative, without picking up personal
responsibility. Of course, compliance with the other duty, i.e., to warn
of breaches (or to warn of some unspecified danger), would allow the
agent to avoid this personal liability, at least if the duties really were
intended to be alternative in nature. However, even a duty to warn
would essentially make the agent an auditor of his principal's contractual
compliance. That would be an extraordinary notion, for even the principal parties themselves owe no duty to report their own breaches to
the other side. Indeed, imposing an auditing or disclosure duty on the
agent would cause the agent's duties to third parties to conflict with
the confidentiality rights of the principal. This type of conflict would
seem to be especially troubling in a banking context, yet the court in
this case has essentially identified a state-law tort duty that could be
interpreted to require bank officers to tip bank customers concerning
the bank's prospective inability to meet its obligations. This obviously
could not have been intended by the court, yet one is left wondering
what the court really had in mind.

45. Id. at 885.
46. A causal connection between the failure to warn and the loss of the eight million
dollars is difficult to surmise. Conceivably, the depositor might have flown to the bank
personally and demanded to take possession immediately of the notes and mortgages
involved, but .the prospects for success in that sort of effort would seem pretty small,
especially in the middle of a financial crisis at the breaching bank. What the depositor
needed was performance, not a too-late warning of an obvious instance of nonperformance.
The only other way a warning might have helped would have been as a selective tip to
this customer, which would have permitted it to obtain a prepayment at the expense of
other innocent depositors. That could not have been what the court meant by a duty to

warn.
The weakness in the warning rationale forces one back to the conclusion that the court
was essentially holding the agent liable for the principal's breach of contract, even if
strictly on a tort theory. It is unlikely, of course, that an agent held liable for his
principal's nonperformance would care very much whether the court was using a tort or
contract theory to impose the liability. Liability under any theory would make service as
an agent an unjustifiably risky undertaking.
47. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3012-3013.
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The court's last statement on the subject may be its most surprising.
The court actually said that "[an employee cannot shield himself behind
a corporate wall when he is the officer responsible for the corporation's
acts in a particular transaction." 8 This statement is either circular (i.e.,
the employee can not avoid personal responsibility when he is personally
responsible), or it is contrary to all traditional understanding of representative agency principles. A corporation can act only by conferring
authority on its agents, i.e., by making them responsible for conducting
its affairs. If the exercise of this authority is what the court was referring
to when it spoke of an officer's "responsibility" for corporate actions,
then it would never be possible for a corporate agent to act in a purely
representative capacity. Certainly, agents cannot avoid personal liability
for their own torts simply on grounds that they committed the tort as
a representative of someone else. For example, a corporate officer is
personally liable for any fraud he commits, whether in connection with
his own affairs or those of his corporate employer.49 However, the law
has not, until this case, imposed a general tort obligation on agents to
see to it that their principals perform their contractual obligations to
third parties, or to "warn" the third parties if the principals do not
so perform. Imposing these duties would eliminate most of the commercial value of agency law.
It is very unlikely that the court intended its statements concerning
the bank officer's personal tort duties to affect agency principles as
profoundly as suggested in this discussion. One can only hope that this
hard case will not be permitted to make bad law. Perhaps other courts
will be willing to limit Fryar to its facts, and to recognize its extraordinary duties only to the extent necessary to exert long arm jurisdiction
over an officer of an out-of-state bank that has squandered away eight
million dollars invested by a Louisiana nonprofit organization.
PARTNERSHIP

Inadvertent Creation
The Louisiana fifth circuit, in John P. Harris, M.D., Inc. v. ParmIey, 10 recited a new, super abbreviated test for the inadvertent creation
of a partnership under Louisiana law. The test consisted of "(1) mutual
consent [to something not specified by the court], (2) participation in

48. 479 So. 2d at 890.
49. See, e.g., La. R.S. 12:95 (1969); Lone Star Indus., Inc. v. American Chem.,
Inc., 461 So. 2d 1063 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 465 So. 2d 738 (La. 1985).
50. 480 So. 2d 500 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985).
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profits and/or losses and (3) [a] proprietary interest in a community of
property."'
\
Characteristically," despite the court's recitation of a new test, the
test had little to do with the outcome of the case. Rather, the decisive
factor seemed to be the powerlessness of the alleged partners in the
partnership to exercise any control over the management of its affairs.
Only one of the alleged "partners" in the subject group of doctors had
any real power over the busm\ness; the others considered him the "boss"
and testified that he "held the strings." 3
Shared control is second in importance only to shared profits in
finding an inadvertent partnership in the forty-eight states that have
adopted the Uniform Partnership Act.5 4 However, it is virtually never
mentioned as one of the "elements" in the Louisiana test for inadvertent
partnerships (except to the extent that it could be considered covered
by the "proprietary interest" language in the widely-recited three element
tests)." This is true even though partners in a Louisiana partnership
normally have equal power under the Civil Code both to participate in
6
the management of the partnership and to bind it to third parties. If
one were searching for factors that would distinguish a partnership from

other forms of business relationships, shared control over management
would easily be one of the most important. This case is worth noting,
therefore, because it provides at least some implicit recognition in the
Louisiana jurisprudence of this commonly-ignored factor.

51. Id. at 502 (emphasis added). For four other tests see Morris, Developments in
the Law, 1984-1985-Business Associations, 46 La. L. Rev. 413, 413-14 nn. I & 3. This
new, "super-abbreviated" three-element test is different from the more traditional threeelement tests in two respects: (i) iteliminates from the first element any description of
what the parties are supposed to be consenting to, and (ii) itrejects the traditional
emphasis on a loss-sharing agreement, requiring instead only a sharing either of profits
or of losses. Both changes are improvements. The first eliminates the circularity and
redundancy of the requirement in the traditional tests that the parties consent to form a
partnership. By stripping the first element of everything but the notion of consent, the
fifth circuit has provided language that might eventually be used to tie consent not to
the legal classification of the relationship, but instead to the more useful "profit-sharing"
and "proprietary interest" factors in the second and third elements of the partnership
tests. The second change, which eliminates the need for a loss-sharing agreement, reflects
one of the 1980 changes to the partnership provisions, the very sensible repeal of an
article that had made "no loss" agreements unenforceable even between the partners
themselves. See Morris, supra, at 419.
52. See Morris, supra note 51, at 413-20.
53. 480 So. 2d at 502.
54. See H. Reuschlein & W. Gregory, Agency and Partnership § 175, at 247-48
(1979). Louisiana and Georgia are the only states that have not adopted the U.P.A. See
Table of Adopting Jurisdictions, 6 U.L.A. I (Supp. 1986).
55. See Morris, supra note 51, at 413-14 nn. I & 3.
56. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2807, 2814.
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Nonbusiness Partnerships
In Ermert v. Hartford Insurance Co.," a guest at a hunting camp
accidentally shot a fellow guest in the foot. The injured guest sued, in
addition to the individual who fired the gun, the owner of the camp,
the owner's business, the owner's insurer, some hunting friends of the
owner who had helped defray some of the expenses of the camp, and
the "joint venture and/or partnership" consisting of the owner and the
contributing friends. The trial court maintained exceptions of no cause
of action or granted summary judgments in favor of all the defendants
except the one who had actually shot the plaintiff.
The appellate court treated the existence of the partnership as a
question of fact, so that the allegations in the plaintiff's petition that
a joint venture and/or partnership existed had to be treated as true for
purposes of ruling on the exceptions. Similarly, the court of appeal held
that conflicting evidence on the factual issue precluded summary judgment. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's rulings in favor
of the defendants and remanded the case for trial.
This seems erroneous. The trial court's rulings should have been
affirmed on the ground that associations formed other than for business
purposes could not, as a matter of law, be treated as partnerships under
the Civil Code. Outside Louisiana, this would surely have been the
correct result, for under the Uniform Partnership Act, a partnership is
defined as "an association of two or more persons to carry on as coowners a business for profit."58 An association formed other than for
profit-oriented business purposes is by definition not a partnership. 9
The Louisiana definition is not quite as clear, but it too seems
designed not to reach associations organized for purposes other than
the co-ownership of a business (or, as the jurisprudence recognizes, a
business venture). The Civil Code defines a partnership as "a juridical
person, distinct from its partners, created by a contract between two
or more persons to combine their efforts or resources in determined
proportions and to collaborate at mutual risk for their common profit
or commercial benefit. ' ' 60 Unless the phrase "common profit" is interpreted to include recreational pleasure (or financial savings in connection
with pursuing recreational pleasure), this definition would seem to exclude groups of the type involved in Ermert. It would be inappropriate
to apply to every unincorporated cooperative group (e.g., many social
clubs, churches and civic organizations) a set of rules designed to govern

57.
1986).
58.
59.
60.

480 So. 2d 999 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 484 So. 2d 672 (La.
Unif. Partnership Act § 6(1), 6 U.L.A. 22 (1969) (emphasis added).
J. Crane & A. Bromberg, Law of Partnership § 13, at 63-65 (1968).
La. Civ. Code art. 2801 (emphasis added).
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the vicarious tort liability of the owners of unincorporated business
organizations. 6 That would be the logical extension of Ermert, however,
for it would be very difficult to distinguish the "common profits" of
many of these kinds of organizations from the type of "profit" enjoyed
by the group of hunters in this case.
Partner Liability for Delictual Obligations of the Partnership
Assuming that the plaintiffs in Ermert 62 should have been held liable
as partners, another feature of the court's analysis is still troubling. The
court did not seem to question the plaintiff's position that the defendants,

if partners, would have been liable in solido for the damages the plaintiff
had suffered. 63 This position might have been defensible had the plaintiff,
been arguing that the defendants had assisted in the commission of the

tort within the meaning of Civil Code article 2324, but he seemed instead
to be saying that the defendants would liable solidarily simply as partners
of the actual tortfeasor. That was simply incorrect. Partners are liable
only on a secondary basis for debts of the partnership entity (as dis-

tinguished' from the debts of partners), and then only for their percapita, or "virile"

share. 64

61. It is easy to understand why the appellate court chose to accept a partnership
theory in this case, for there are some easily ascertainable rules concerning the vicarious
tort liability of partnerships and partners. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2320 & 2817. In
contrast, no legislation or jurisprudence seems to exist in Louisiana that discusses the
vicarious tort liability of members of unincorporated associations. The only Civil Code
provision dealing with unincorporated associations, La. Civ. Code art. 446, concerns the
limited recognition given to these bodies for purposes of owning and transferring property.
A court might well reason that such groups should also be recognized for the limited
purpose of subjecting the groups' assets to claims by the various creditors of the group,
including tort victims. It would be a much greater step, however, and one much harder
to justify, for a court to hold the group members themselves personally liable for the
obligations of the group. In many cases, these obligations would arise from conduct
having only the weakest of connections to non-controlling members of the group.
62. Ermert v. Hartford Ins. Co., 480 So. 2d 999 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 484 So. 2d 672 (La. 1986).
63. 480 So. 2d at 1001.
64. La. Civ. Code art. 2817. Incidentally, the use of the term "virile" as a synonym
of "per-capita" in the new partnership articles (see infra notes 66-70 and accompanying
text) has turned out not to have been a very good idea, for later changes in the definition
of "virile" in the obligations articles has produced a potential for confusion. After the
1980 revision of the partnership articles, in which the term "virile" was used to describe
the per-capita liability imposed under the old provisions on ordinary partners (see La.
Civ. Code arts. 2873 (1870), 2103 (1960); Cortiza v. Rosenblat, 291 So. 2d 425 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1974); Cambre v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 331 So. 2d 585 (La. App.
1st Cir.), cert denied, 334 So. 2d 434 (La. 1976)), the term "virile" was used in article
1804 of the new obligations provisions to refer not only to the per-capita liability imposed
as between solidary contractual obligors (see La. Civ. Code art. 2103 (1960)), but also

19861

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS

The official comment to the relevant provision, Civil Code article
2817, does say that the secondary, virile liability rule does not apply
where in delictual matters solidary liability is imposed as a matter of
law. 65 Nevertheless, this comment must be referring to solidary liability
such as that imposed under Civil Code article 2324, because nothing in

the Civil Code imposes solidary liability on partners for the tort obligations of the partnership based simply on their status as partners.
Article 2817 is the only provision on point, and it provides that the

vicarious liability of partners for the debts of the partnership is virile,
not solidary. The comments to this provision say that the article was
designed to bring forward into the 1980 partnership articles the old
approach to the liability of ordinary partners. 66 That approach was to
impose per capita liability with respect to all obligations of the partnership, whether conventional or delictual. 67 This contrasted with the
6
solidary liability imposed on partners in a commercial partnership.
The 1980 provisions abolished the different types of partnerships
(except for the distinction between general partnerships and partnerships
in commendam) 69 and chose the per-capita, ordinary-partner type of
liability for all general partners."0 That is just as clear under the current

to the "percentage of fault" shares of solidary tort obligors. Unfortunately for one trying
to interpret the partnership articles, this obligations provision is as close as the Civil Code
now comes to defining the term "virile."
It therefore is possible to read articles 2817 and 1804 in conjunction to say that the
liability of partners to third parties would depend on fault in a tort case and would be
per-capita, subject to contractual modification among the obligor partners, in a contract
case. This would be wrong not only from an historical standpoint, but would also be
wrong contextually. Article 1804 purports only to describe the inter sese obligations of
solidary obligors; as to third parties, the solidary obligors would obviously be liable for
the entire debt. It would make no sense, then, to use article 1804 to define the obligations
owed by partners not to one another but to third party obligees of the partnership. Also,
permitting the partners to agree with one another concerning limitations on their obligations
to third parties (as using article 1804 here would allow) would be inconsistent with, and
in some cases directly contradictory of, article 2815 of the partnership provisions, which
makes "no participation in loss" agreements unenforceable against third parties.
65. La. Civ. Code art. 2817 comment c.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 2872 (1870) & 2873 (1870); Cortiza v. Rosenblat,
291 So. 2d 425, 428-29 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974)(contractual); Cambre v. St. Paul Fire
and Marine Ins. Co., 331 So. 2d 585, 591 (La. App. Ist Cir., cert. denied, 334 So. 2d
434, 435 (La. 1976)(tort-medical malpractice).
68. La. Civ. Code art. 2872 (1870).
69. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2836-2848.
70. See La. Civ. Code art. 2817 comment c. The term, "general partners," was used
in the text to exclude partners in commendam from the coverage of the virile portion
rule. Partners in commendam must agree to contribute something of value to the partnership, but their membership-based liability is limited to the making of the agreed
contribution. La. Civ. Code art. 2840 comment (a).
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provisions of the Code as was the solidary rule under the older provisions.
Capital Contribution to Partnership Treated as Donation
In Broussard v. Crochet, Broussard & Co.,7I a variety of contractual
interpretation issues were well-handled in the context of a complicated
dissolution battle.72 However, the third circuit did seem to err in the
approach it took in determining whether certain partnership-related movable property had been contributed to the partnership, or had continued
to be owned by one of the partners personally.
This will always be a difficult type of issue factually, for the partnership provisions of the Civil Code contain no rules on the proper
mechanism for transferring ownership of movable property from a partner to his partnership. It is recognized, of course, that the partnership
is a separate juridical person, distinct from its partners, so that it can
own property independently of the ownership interests of the partners
in the equity of the partnership. 7 Nevertheless, the "contract formation"
4
and "transfer of possession" tests for voluntary transfers of movables
will normally be difficult to apply with respect to transfers between an
individual and the business (or businesses) that he owns. This is so
because the law on transfers of movables is based on the assumption
that the transferor and transferee are different people. They are, of
course, even in partnership cases, under the fiction that the partnership
is a juridical person distinct from its owners. Nevertheless, the law's
insistence that at least two people are involved in these transfers, even
if one is fictional, does not change the simple fact that in many of
these transactions just one human being is engaging in observable conduct. Contracts between an owner and his business may very well be
negotiated strictly between the owner and himself, and transfers of
possession will often take place only in legal contemplation. Thus, a
court will often find it difficult to determine whether such contracts
have been formed and whether the physical possession of a given item
of property has been transferred somehow from the owner in his individual capacity to the owner in his representative capacity.
It therefore would seem appropriate in such cases to shift one's
attention from what "really" happened between the fictional person and

71. 477 So. 2d 166 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
72. Two other complicated dissolution cases decided last year were Thompson v.
Grantham, 489 So. 2d 414 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986) and Makar v. Stewart, 486 So. 2d
166 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
73. La. Civ. Code art. 2801 comments (a) & (e).
74. See La. Civ. Code art. 518; cf. S. Litvinoff, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise,
Obligations, Book 2, § 17, at 21 (West 1975).
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its owner to what should be deemed to have happened based on the
owner's conduct. In the case of a dispute among partners in connection
with a dissolution of their partnership, the appropriate approach would
seem to be to determine whether the conduct of the partner claiming
personal ownership of the property had, from the standpoint of the
other partners, created the impression that the property involved had
been contributed to the partnership. If so, regardless of that partner's
subjective intentions, the property should be treated as partnership property. In effect, the "contract" test of Civil Code article 518 ought to
be applied with sensitivity both to the tacit arrangements common in
small businesses, and to the difficulties of proving such arrangements
except by circumstantial evidence.
In Broussard, this approach would have resulted in treating the
property involved, office equipment, as the property of the partnership.
The contributing partner had used the assets for years in the partnership
business and had permitted them to be counted as partnership property
in calculating the partnership's depreciation deductions for tax purposes.75
It seems unlikely under those circumstances that the noncontributing
partners had any idea that the contributor still considered this property
to be his personally.
Instead, the court in Broussard took a much different approach. It
treated the alleged transfer of equipment as a donation, which meant
that the noncontributing partners, lacking an authentic act, had to "show
by strong and convincing proof that the donor had the intent to irrev' 76
ocably divest himself of the thing and that real delivery was made."
The court found that proof of the simple use and depreciation of the
equipment by the partnership was insufficient evidence to meet this
burden.
It is not clear why the court took this donation approach. It appears
that the nontechnical meaning of donation, as a rough synonym for a
contribution or transfer, led the court to the donation provisions of the
Civil Code, where the term is used in a technical sense to refer strictly
to transactions motivated at least in part by the liberality or generosity
77
of the donor.
It does not seem plausible that capital contributions by owners to
their businesses could be considered to be motivated by unselfish generosity.7 1 In fact, if the partnership in Broussard was sol-

75. 477 So. 2d at 174.
76. Id.
77. S. Litvinoff, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, Obligations, Book I, § 103, at 18081 (West 1969).
78. The son of the contributing partner in Broussard did eventually acquire a 150
interest in the partnership, but this occurred after the date of most of the transfers.
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vent 79 at the time of the transfers, then the contributing partner would

have received in exchange for his contributions claims against the assets of
the partnership virtually equal in value to the equipment contributed.
Although he no longer owned the equipment directly, he did own a
priority equity interest in the partnership that was increased in value as a
result of the contribution of the equipment. 0 He thus changed more the
form of his assets than their aggregate value. He could not have been
making a donation under these circumstances. The Broussardapproach to
capital contributions is unsound and ought to be rejected.
Withdrawal, Admission of Partners
Bourgeois v. Medical Center of East New Orleans" involved an appeal
from the dismissal of a declaratory judgment action in which certain
partners in a medical partnership had challenged the lawfulness of the
managing partner's agreement to sell both his ownership interest and his
management powers to a hospital. The fourth circuit reversed the trial
court's dismissal, ruling, among other things, that the purported sale of
the management powers was "contra bonos mores." 8 Although the
result was unquestionably correct, the court might have struck down

Moreover, even with some motive to give, the contributor's receipt of a claim against
the partnership virtually equal in value to the contributed assets would have prevented
the application of donative formalities under the test in Civil Code article 1526. See infra
notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
79. There was no indication that it was not solvent. If, however, the liabilities of
the partnership had exceeded its assets, then a contribution of property to the partnership
might have served only to increase the pool of assets against which the partnership
creditors could have enforced their claims. See La. Civ. Code art. 2833. It is very unlikely
even under these circumstances, however, that a contributing partner would be acting with
the intention of donating the contributed property to the partnership's creditors.
80. Claims for the repayment of the capital contributions of partners are senior in
priority to the partners' claims to the residual. La. Civ. Code art. 2833. This priority
treatment would have kept the other partners from sharing in the value of the contributed
assets simply as the result of the transfer of title from the owner to the partnership.
They would, of course, be entitled (or obligated) to share as owners both in the changes
in value (up or down) after the contributions and in the earnings produced by the
partnership's utilization of the contributed assets.
Indeed, except for complicating the case factually, the contributing partner in Broussard
would probably have been better off not-claiming-the -old, presumably depreciated, office
equipment itself, but claiming instead a priority "capital contribution" payment based on
the value of the equipment at the time it was contributed. This approach would have
allowed him to be compensated for the "using up" of the equipment for the benefit of
the partnership.
81. 482 So. 2d 795 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).
82. Id. at 800. The court characterized this part of the agreement as an attempt by
the manager to sell something he did not "own," a job. This obviously was not a reason
to strike down the agreement, but only another way of stating the court's conclusion that
the management powers ought not be capable of sale.
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this part of the agreement on the narrower, more modest and more
defensible ground, that it was simply violative of any reasonable interpretation of the agreement among the partners. It is not at all clear
why the public should be deemed to have some sort of regulatory interest
in this sort of transaction, and the court offers no clues on what it
might have had in mind. 83
On a tougher issue, the court ruled that a first refusal provision in
the partnership agreement did not have the effect of changing the voting
requirement for the withdrawal or admission of partners from the unanimity established as a suppletory matter by Civil Code article 2807.84
This essentially turned the first-refusal provision on its head, for it now
could be interpreted only as a restriction on the normal power of partners
to "share" their interests and not as a liberalization of the normal
restrictions on the admission of purchasers as actual partners in the
partnership."5
This result could be rationalized technically on the ground that the
court was not free to insert a change in voting standards where the
parties could have specified the term but had not. Nevertheless, the
result was probably not consistent with the intention of the parties. As
the Civil Code indicates, unless the partners agree otherwise, they may
not transfer their interest in the partnership if any other partner objects."
This makes sense as a suppletory provision because of the management
powers conferred on all members of the partnership. 7 However, where
the parties have taken the time to negotiate a right of first refusal
provision, the implication is very strong that they intended to replace
the "no transfer if anyone objects" rule with a less rigorous restraint
on alienation."

83. It certainly is not self-evident that partners, if they wished to do so, ought not
be permitted to contract for management services, and to make the management contract
assignable.
84. 482 So. 2d at 800.
85. It is difficult to imagine why a partner would negotiate a right of first refusal
provision, and then subject a sale of his partnership interest to the almost impossible
second hurdle of a unanimous vote. He would already have had the power simply to
"share" his interest (i.e., to sell or assign it without gaining the actual admission of the
buyer to the partnership) without any need to subject his transaction to a vote or to
offer it first to the partnership. La. Civ. Code art. 2812. If, as the court suggested, the
partners intended to require a unanimous vote for the admission of the partner, even
after satisfying the first refusal provision, then the partners must have intended for the
first refusal provision not to liberalize the admission vote, but to restrict the sharing
decision. This seems unlikely.
86. La. Civ. Code art. 2807.
87. La. Civ. Code arts. 2807, 2814.
88. See supra note 85.
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These devices are widely used in connection with closely-held corporations, and do not normally require a unanimous vote in that setting.8 9
It is likely that the drafters of the provisions involved in this case simply
overlooked the need to consider the peculiarities of partnership law in
preparing the pertinent agreement. For the business planner, therefore,
the case becomes a warning of a dangerous "trap for the unwary."
Finally, after discussing the voting requirement issue, the court quickly
and easily disposed of a desperate-sounding argument by the selling
partner that the unanimity requirement of article 2807 applied only to
the admission of "new" partners in the sense of "additional" partners,
and did not apply where one person was simply being "substituted"
for another as partner 0 The court took the only sensible approach in
holding that article 2807 applied whenever the number or identity of
the partners was being changed. 9
CORPORATIONS

Stock Transfer Restrictions-Strict Construction
In Louisiana Weekly Publishing Co. v. First National Bank of
Commerce,92 the articles of incorporation of a company granted a right
of first refusal to the corporation, and then to shareholders, with respect
to any sale by a shareholder of stock in the company. The same provision
also stated that upon the death of any shareholder, the stock owned
by that shareholder "shall go to his legal heirs." 93 The transaction being
challenged was an inter vivos donation of the stock.
The trial court and the first circuit interpreted the transfer restrictions
to prohibit the inter vivos donation, even though that type of transaction
was not covered expressly by the articles of incorporation. The courts
reasoned that the parties to the transfer restriction had adequately expressed their intention to restrict transfers generally, and could not
possibly have intended to provide the "donation" loophole discovered
by the transferring shareholder.94
The supreme court reversed, however, on the ground that stock
transfer restrictions, as restraints against the free transferability of prop-

89.

In a corporate setting, it is the restriction of transferability, and not its liber-

alization, that is subjected to close scrutiny. See La. Weekly Publ. Co. v. First Nat'l
Bank of Commerce, 483 So. 2d 929, 932-33 (La. 1986).
90. 482 So. 2d at 801.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
483 So. 2d 929 (La. 1986).
Id.at 931.
Id.at 932.
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erty, must be interpreted strictly. 9 The majority quoted one sentence
out of Professor Andre's article, Restrictions on the Transfer of Shares:
A Search for Public Policy,96 in support of its holding, 97 while ignoring
Professor Andre's conclusion that there really was no good reason to
treat transfer restrictions as a "disfavored" type of legal device. 98 Indeed,
the court did exactly what Andr6 had criticized in his article: it ignored
all of the commonly-recognized, important uses of these types of provisions and then relied on a simple recitation of the law's "favoring"
the free alienability of property, in order to reach a result that makes
these devices unusually difficult to enforce.
As Justice Lemmon stated in his dissent, citing Professor Andr6
accurately, transfer restrictions should not be implied as a matter of
law in a corporate setting; free transferability of ownership interests is
one of the widely acknowledged "normal" attributes of a corporate
form of organization. However, once the parties clearly indicate their
intention to abrogate the suppletory rule that favors unrestricted transferability, there is no reason not to interpret the restrictions they do
choose to impose in the very same way that most other contracts are
interpreted .99
Indeed, one has to wonder whether the fight over the interpretational
standards in this case did not really mask a more fundamental disagreement over judicial activism in contract interpretation generally. The
majority may simply have favored a more literalist approach generally
in contract interpretation than did Justice Lemmon. If so, the interpretational device was more a makeweight than the deciding factor in
the case, for it would then have been important only as a means of
avoiding the broader, more fundamental issue.
Enforceability of Nonlegended Restrictions
Without discussing the issue at any length, the court in Louisiana
Weekly seemed to accept the view that stock transfer restrictions are
enforceable against persons with actual knowledge of them, even if they
are not noted on the stock certificate.100 This is at odds with Louisiana
Revised Statutes 12:57F, which provides that restrictions not noted are
completely unenforceable,"" but is correct under Louisiana Revised Stat-

95. Id. at 932-33.
96. 53 Tul. L. Rev. 776 (1977).
97. 483 So. 2d at 933, quoting Andre, supra note 96, at 822.
98. Andre, supra note 96, at 826-27.
99. 483 So. 2d at 934 (Lemmon, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 933 n.10.
101. La. R.S. 12:57F (1969)("No ... restriction on the transfer of shares ... shall
be recognized or enforced, unless such restriction ... is set forth or summarized [or
referred to] ... in the certificates .... ").
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utes 10:8-204, the Louisiana version of U.C.C. Section 8-204, which
recognizes an "actual knowledge" exception to the general rule of nonenforceability of nonlegended transfer restrictions.""0 This issue had been
discussed explicitly in an earlier appellate decision, Thibodeaux v. Pioneer
Land Development & Realty Corp., °3 in which the Louisiana fifth circuit
had ruled that the actual knowledge language of the U.C.C. provision
controlled."' 4 Thibodeaux was cited with approval in a footnote discussion
of the issue in Louisiana Weekly. 05
Valuation-Stock of Closely-Held Corporations
In Combs v. Howard," the third circuit affirmed a trial court
finding that the defendant had breached a letter agreement to transfer
49% of the stock in his wholly-owned oil field services corporation to
a new managing "partner" in exchange for the new participant's agreement to manage the corporation's business for $6500 per month.""
However, the court reversed the trial court's finding that the plaintiff
had failed to prove any damages as a result of the breach.' 5
The court implicitly agreed with the trial court's view that the
plaintiff was not necessarily entitled to his proportionate share of the
$265,000 book value of the company."°9 Itdisagreed, however, with the
trial court's apparent acceptance of the views of the defendant's experts.
They had testified that 49% of the stock in a company owned 51% by
someone else was, at best, economically worthless. One of the defendant's
experts had even testified that the stock actually had a negative value
because the company had elected "S corporation" tax treatment. This
made the minority owner personally responsible for the payment of taxes
on 49% of the company's income, even though the company had never
paid any dividends to him.
In rejecting this testimony, the third circuit reasoned that the stock
must have had some positive value in order to have been covered in

102. La. R.S. 10:8-204 (1969)("A restriction on transfer shall be effective, even if the
restriction is not noted on the certificate, against persons having actual knowledge of the
restriction.").
103. 420 So. 2d 1162 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982).
104. Id. at 1166.
105. 483 So. 2d at 933 n.10.
106. 481 So. 2d 179 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 484 So. 2d 671 (La. 1986).
107. Id.at 180-86.
108. Id.at 181-82.
109. Id.at 182. The plaintiff apparently did not challenge the use of book value as
an appropriate ceiling figure. His expert, a C.P.A., was said to have "admitted" that
market value and book value were not always the same. No one presented an "earnings
value" or "asset value" calculation, which might have created a starting figure higher
than book value.
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the letter agreement as part of the compensation for the manager's
services. The court also recognized, however, the need for a minority

discount in valuing a noncontrolling interest in a closely-held corporation.
Accordingly, the trial court's denial of relief was reversed, and the
minority discount off book value was set at 80%. Judgment was rendered

for $25,000.110 Judge Knoll felt that the discount should have been only
20%, and so dissented from the valuation part of the opinion.,'
It was not true, of course, that the simple inclusion of the stock

term in the letter agreement had to mean that the stock had had a
positive value; the new manager may very well have been mistaken about

the economic value of a minority interest in a closely-held corporation.
Even if the stock actually had had some economic value, $25,000 seems
to have been a pretty generous minimum figure.
On the other hand, it is difficult to say that the court
to reject the accepted wisdom that minority stock in a
corporation is, by itself, virtually worthless. The reason the
experts could testify that the stock was virtually worthless

was wrong
closely-held
defendant's
is that cor-

poration law confers virtually no power on a minority participant in a
closely-held company to protect his interest in the business." 2 If the law
provided better protections, the stock might be more valuable.'"' Thus,
in rejecting the experts' widely-accepted "worthlessness" views, the third

circuit may simply have been saying that the law in this particular case
was going to provide more effective protections. The dissent, of course,
did not disagree with this conclusion, it just wanted to go further.
Unfortunately for minority investors, though, Combs does not make
this type of protection available generally. Combs dealt only with the
valuation of stock for purposes of calculating damages for the breach
of a contract to sell the stock. Combs probably could be expanded to

110. 481 So. 2d at 182.
I11. Id.at 182-83.
112. Minority owners of a corporation may (and very often do) receive substantial

benefits in the form of salaries and perquisites. Nevertheless, these benefits generally result
from informal arrangements that may be terminated on short notice by the controlling
persons. The minority stock itself does little more than give the disappointed investor the
standing to take a shot at overcoming the business judgment doctrine either in connection
with a derivative suit or in an action for involuntary liquidation. The corporation law in
this area contrasts sharply with partnership law. In a partnership, in the absence of a
contrary agreement, each partner has the right to participate on a per-capita basis in
management decisions, and to bind the partnership to good faith third parties in the
ordinary course of the partnership's business. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2807, 2814. More
importantly, each partner has the power, subject to agreement, to withdraw from the
partnership and to require the partnership to pay him the value of his interest. See La.
Civ. Code arts. 2822-2825.
113. Of course, the overall value of the company might be depressed by the prospect
of effective minority dissension, but a fair-sized piece even of a less valuable company
would be worth more to the minority investor than what he gets now.
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deal with valuation in the case of other kinds of partial liquidations,
but liquidations of any kind are difficult to accomplish without the
cooperation of the controlling shareholders.' 4 Indeed, the plaintiff in
Combs was himself lucky both that the defendant breached the agreement, and that the court was willing to award monetary damages, even
though a nonsubstitutional remedy, specific performance, would have
been both practical and better suited to putting the parties in the positions
they would have been had the defendant not breached his duties to the
plaintiff."' Had the plaintiff in this case actually obtained the stock he
had been promised, he would have been stuck with a minority interest
in a corporation controlled by someone who was already mad at him.
He would then have faced the almost impossible task of persuading a
court that the corporation involved should be ordered to liquidate, even
over the objections of its majority owner, because the two owners could
no longer get along. ' 6
The inconsistency between this hypothetical result and the one that

actually occurred might lead a management-oriented lawyer to conclude
that the plaintiff in this case should never have been awarded damages.
A lawyer for minority investors, though, might just take what he could
get and hope that consistency would be restored by increasing, rather

114. Corporation law calls for involuntary partial liquidations only in connection with
the minority shareholders' dissenting from certain types of business combinations. See La.
R.S. 12:131 (1969 and Supp. 1986). Otherwise, the minority investor is put in the unenviable
position of having to argue that just because he is unhappy and wants out, the entire
corporation should be liquidated. See La. R.S. 12:143 (1969 and Supp. 1986). Involuntary
liquidation is difficult to obtain. Even in the case of a deadlock among shareholders, it
requires a showing not only that "irreparable injury to the shareholders is being suffered,"
but also that "such irreparable injury warrants dissolution after giving due regard to the
interests of the other shareholders, the employees, and the public." La. R.S. 12:143 A
(5) (Supp. 1986).
In the absence of provisions openly protecting the minority investors' need to withdraw
from incorporated businesses, an owner wishing to withdraw has to negotiate a buy-out
with the controlling persons. He will often find it helpful in these situations to threaten
costly derivative litigation as a means of improving his negotiating leverage. Still, because
of the strength of "business judgment" protections of managerial decisions, and the fact

that the dissenter's dispute does not so much concern mismanagement as it does the
controlling persons' decisions about allocating some jobs to which the dissenter has no
legally-enforceable right, the plaintiff's chance of succeeding on the merits in such litigation
is very small. See infra notes 117-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of a liberal

demand rule in derivative litigation.
,115. The fifth circuit, in Haggerty v. March, 480 So. 2d 1064 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1985), avoided the valuation question by declaring null the fraudulently-induced transfer
that had given rise to the claim for damages. The analogous remedy in Combs would

have been an order of specific performance. Had specific performance been granted, the
plaintiff would actually have received the stock itself, and the court would have avoided
the need to discuss the extraordinarily difficult valuation issue.

116. See supra note 114.

19861

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS

than by consistently denying, effective protections for the interests of
minority investors. The overall economic impact of such protections
would be extraordinarily difficult to predict or to measure.
Derivative Suit Demand Futility
Smith v. Wembley Industries" 7 is the first Louisiana decision to
construe the "demand futility" requirement of article 596 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. Article 596 requires the plaintiff in a
shareholder derivative action to allege "with particularity" either his
efforts to obtain corrective actions from the company's directors, and
"if necessary" the shareholders, or the reason for not making such an
effort." 8 Most other states, as well as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, impose the same requirements." 9
Enormous uncertainty exists over the interpretation of this procedural
rule in the context of enforcing principles of substantive corporation
law. While the substantive law imposes fiduciary duties on directors, it
also confers management powers, including the power to control corporate litigation, exclusively on the company's board of directors. 2"
Emphasizing the board's exclusive management powers, Delaware has
recently been hostile to the derivative suit, and has interpreted the
language involved in Wembley Industries in a way that would have
rejected the plaintiffs' allegations of demand futility.' 2 '
The plaintiffs in Wembley alleged that three of the five corporate
directors had breached their fiduciary duties to the corporation by causing
the corporation to pay the three directors extravagently, in salaries,
bonuses and perks, even though the corporation was having financial
difficulties. The other two directors were alleged to have been dependent
on the self-dealing directors for their jobs, so that a demand by the
plaintiffs for corrective action by the board would have been futile for
purposes of article 596.122
The trial court granted defendant's exception of prematurity, but
the fourth circuit reversed. Without citing the leading cases, 21 the Louisiana court rejected the heavily-debated Delaware view that a decision

117. 490 So. 2d 1107 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).
118. La. Code Civ. P. art. 596(2).
119. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1. For a listing of state provisions, see DeMott, Demand in
Derivative Actions: Problems of Interpretation and Function, 19 U.C.D. L. Rev. 461,
463-64 n.3 (1986).
120. DeMott, supra note 119.
121. Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805
(Del. 1984); see infra note 124.
122. 490 So. 2d at 1107-08.
123. Pogostin, 480 A.2d 619; Aronson, 473 A.2d 805; Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,
430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
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to litigate, like any other management decisioii, is entitled to "business
judgment" deference,24 and that boards tainted by self-interest are still
capable of appointing disinterested litigation committees to make the
appropriate decisions for the company. 25 Rather, the court accepted the
more traditional view that a director being sued for alleged self-dealing
or carelessness cannot be expected to make a disinterested decision about
suing himself. 26 Implicitly, the court also seemed to be saying that it
was not possible, as the Delaware cases had suggested, for a defendant
director to select other, objective, disinterested individuals to make these
decisions for the company.
Although the court spoke in its opinion as if the defendants actually
were guilty of the wrongs alleged (and that was appropriate to some
extent given the procedural posture of the case), it should be emphasized
that the impact of the court's ruling is not simply to prevent dishonest
directors from blocking derivative actions against them, but is also to
allow plaintiffs to skip the demand stage of a derivative action simply
by alleging that the directors have been engaged in unlawful behavior.
This is what creates the danger of strike suits that the Delaware courts
have been so concerned about.
Nevertheless, one major difference between the types of cases that
the Delaware courts often see, and those presented to Louisiana courts,
is that the Delaware cases are much more likely to involve suits against
large, publicly-traded corporations. Roughly half of the Fortune 500
companies are incorporated in Delaware.' 27 The likelihood of strike suits
is probably greater in connection with these public companies than it

124. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811-12; Pogostin, 480 A.2d at 624-25. The Delaware court
purports to "balance" the business judgment deference against the shareholder's right to
bring a derivative action, by requiring only a "reasonable doubt" concerning the "independence, interest and exercise of business judgment" by the defendant directors.
Pogostin, 480 A.2d at 624-25. However, in application, it imposes "particularity" requirements on the pleadings so stringent that reasonable doubt is extraordinarily difficult
to establish. In Aronson, the court ruled that reasonable doubt had not been created by
the plaintiff's allegations that it was futile to demand action from a board composed
purely of directors chosen by the dominant stockholder, all of whom were alleged to
have breached their fiduciary duties to the corporation (i) by making $225,000 in interestfree loans to the dominant stockholder, and (ii) by an "employment" contract that provided
the 75-year-old dominant stockholder a salary of $150,000 annually, plus a 5% bonus,
and which was terminable early only by the stockholder, and provided death benefits and
six figure salaries for life, even after termination.
125. 430 A.2d at 786.
126. 490 So. 2d at 1108-09.
127. 72 ABA Journal 20 (Sept. 1, 1986). In 1971, thirteen of the twenty-five largest
industrial corporations in the United States were chartered in Delaware. A. Conard,
Corporations in Perspective 13-14 (1976). In 1974, 52 of the largest 100 such companies
were Delaware corporations. Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware's General Corporation
Law of 1899, I Del. J. Corp. L. 249, 283 (1976).

19861

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS

is with those owned by just a few individuals, for the public-company
strike-suit lawyer is not only much more likely to find a stockholder
capable of serving as a nominal plaintiff, he also has a better chance
at obtaining large attorneys' fees payable, with little cost to himself,
out of the treasury of the company.' 28 Similarly, directors of public
companies, facing personal liability if no settlement is reached and
bearing virtually none of the costs of settlement, are often amenable to
settlement arrangements that are highly favorable to the plaintiffs' law29
yers. 1
In contrast, it is fairly unlikely that the owners of a closely-held
company are going to spend their own company's money in connection
with a derivative action unless they are engaged in a genuine dispute
over the management or earnings distribution policies of the company.
In a rough sense, the liberal approach of the fourth circuit in Wembley,
when applied to closely-held companies, moves the minority investor
closer to the position he would be in as a minority partner in a partnership. As a partner, but not as a shareholder, a minority investor
would generally have the power to force a liquidation of his interest
should he become dissatisfied with his treatment. 3 While, as a legal
matter, Wembley still confers no such rights on minority shareholders,
it does as a practical matter give the dissatisfied minority investor some
leverage in negotiating with the controllers of the company either for
a change in company policy, or for a liquidation of his interest. If the
controllers refuse to negotiate appropriately, 3' the minority investor will
very often be able to find something in the company's recent past to
create factual issues concerning the controlling persons' loyalty, diligence
or judgment. This will generally be enough for a derivative action under
the Wembley rule, and the derivative action will often be settled by
liquidating the complaining shareholder's interest. In effect, then, Wembley helps the minority investor force a partial liquidation, largely on
surreptitious grounds, in the event he becomes so dissatisfied with his
treatment at the hands of the controlling persons that he is willing to
risk his own money in pursuing a derivative action against controlling
directors who will also have something to lose both in the lawsuit and
in a settlement. Pure strike suits in this setting are unlikely. 3 2 Still, as

128. For a treatment of strike suit lawyers as entrepreneurs in litigation, see Coffee,
The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 Law
& Contemp. Probs. 5 (1985). For an economic criticism of derivative litigation, see Fischel
and Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 261 (1986).
129. Coffee, supra note 128, at 23-24.
130. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2822-2825.
131. For a brief discussion of the minority investors' legal position in such negotiations,
see supra notes 112-14.
132. See supra notes 112-14.
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Liberalization of Derivative Suit Indemnification
Much of what Wembley' gave to derivative suit plaintiffs, the
legislature took away in its 1986 regular session by amending the indemnification provisions of the Louisiana Business Corporation Law. 3 4 Before
they were amended, these provisions followed the widely accepted, traditional approach of prohibiting, without court approval, the reimbursement of company personnel for losses and expenses incurred by them as
the result of a derivative action in which they had been adjudged to have
violated their fiduciary duties to the corporation." 5 The prohibition made
sense because the directors could otherwise avoid all actual liability for
their violations of duty simply by causing the company itself, the victim of
the wrongdoing, to indemnify the wrongdoers.
Several "loopholes" did exist even under the older provisions: (i) mere
judgments for the plaintiffs in the derivative actions were not themselves
to be deemed presumptions of wrongdoing by the defendants;' 3 6 (ii) in the
absence of true adjudications of misconduct, sympathetic parties could
make the determination of compliance with the applicable standards; 37
(iii) certain indemnity-eligible settlements could be made by sympathetic
parties that would eliminate the possibility of an adverse adjudication;""
and (iv) insurance could be purchased by the corporation that would
provide coverage for the officers and directors broader than that allowed
under the indemnification provisions themselves.'3 9
The 1986 amendments liberalized the indemnification statute in three
respects. First, the egregiousness of the conduct necessary to cut off the
right to indemnification was increased from "negligence or misconduct"
to "willful or intentional misconduct.' ' 4 While significant, that was not
the most important of the new provisions. Cases imposing liability on

133. 490 So. 2d 1107.
134. 1986 La. Acts No. 561.
135. La. R.S. 12:83 A (1969 & Supp. 1986); cf. Model Business Corp. Act Ann. §
5(b) (1971); Revised Model Business Corp. Act § 8.51(d)(1) (1985)(prohibiting indemnification in a derivative action where director adjudged liable).
136. La. R.S. 12:83 A (Supp. 1986). Under the Revised Model Business Corp. Act §
8.51(d)(1), adjudication of liability cuts off the right to indemnification, without the need
of a special adjudication of misconduct.
137. La. R.S. 12:83 C, D (1969)(allowing the board of directors to select the "independent legal counsel" that is to make the misconduct determination).
138. La. R.S. 12:83 A (Supp. 1986)(Indemnity payment in derivative action may include
settlement amounts not exceeding "in the judgment of the board of directors the estimated
expense of litigating the action to conclusion." As a practical matter, of course, the court
could review such a settlement under La. Code Civ. P. art. 594 if the action was being
pursued as a secondary class action.).
139. La. R.S. 12:83 F (1969).
140. La. R.S. 12:83 A (as amended by 1986 La. Acts No. 561).
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the right to indemnification was increased from "negligence or misconduct" to "willful or intentional misconduct."''"

While significant, that

was not the most important of the new provisions. Cases imposing
liability on directors for simple negligence, without some self-dealing

thrown in, are rare anyway.

41

The second. change consisted of a series of clarifications and liberalizations of the existing loopholes concerning the determination of
the indemnitees' compliance with the applicable standard of conduct.

The rule concerning adjudications of misconduct was changed to allow
the exhaustion of all appeals before the right to indemnification was

cut off.

42

Also, it was made clear that in the absence of such an

adjudication of misconduct, "independent legal counsel" could upon
the request of the board make the appropriate determination, even if
the directors on the requesting board were themselves parties to the
litigation. 43 A couple of other similar "conflict of interest" problems
were resolved in a similar fashion, by permitting the conflict to exist
without affecting the validity of the decision involved.' 4 As was true

for the modification of the standard of conduct itself, these incremental
procedural changes were important, but not earth-shaking. For the most
part, they simply cleared up ambiguities in favor of defendant directors.
The last change, however, was fundamental. It expanded the existing

"insurance" exception so much that it is now capable of swallowing
the rule. A company still may not indemnify its personnel for breaches
of their duties to the corporation, but they may provide them benefits

under "self-insurance" arrangements containing on any terms the board
of directors may deem appropriate. 45 The provisions of the Insurance
Code are not to apply to wholly-owned subsidiaries that issue only this

kind of insurance to their parent companies, and "[i]n the absence of

140.

La. R.S. 12:83 A (as amended by 1986 La. Acts No. 561).

141.

In the well-known words of Professor Joseph Bishop, "[tlhe search for cases in

which directors of industrial corporations have been held liable in derivative suits for
negligence uncomplicated by self-dealing is a search for a very small number of needles
in a very large haystack." Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the
Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 Yale L. J. 1078, 1099 (1968).
Professor Bishop found only four such cases. Later research has uncovered three more.
Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and
Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 591, 591 nn. I & 2
(1983).
142. La. R.S. 12:83 A (as amended by 1986 La. Acts No. 561).
143. La. R.S. 12:83 C (as amended by 1986 La. Acts No. 561).
144. Subsections D and E were amended to make it clear that expenses could be

advanced, and other benefits paid, despite the fact that the decision-makers were parties
to the litigation involved or beneficiaries of the action taken. La. R.S. 12:83 D, E (as
amended by 1986 La. Acts No. 561).
145. La. R.S. 12:83 F (as amended by 1986 La. Acts No. 561).
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actual fraud, the judgment of the board of directors as to the terms
and conditions of such insurance ... shall be conclusive." '46 The insurance arrangements may not be voided, nor do they not expose approving directors to liability on any ground other than "actual fraud,"
even if the approving directors are themselves beneficiaries of the very
7
insurance they establish. 1
This provision seems to be designed to allow indemnification on
any terms the board desires, as long as it is called self-insurance.
Although the new provisions do appear to contemplate separate funds
for the self-insurance arrangements, 4 ' that should pose no serious problem to any reasonably imaginative lawyer, for wholly-owned subsidiaries
can provide such insurance without becoming subject to any of the
usual regulatory restrictions on how the "insurance" funds are to be
"invested." Some careful intercompany bookkeeping should do the trick,
permitting "self-insurance" without affecting in any significant way the
49
real costs of running the corporation.
The new provisions are likely to strengthen the position of the
controlling persons of corporations, for they will be capable of causing
the company to "insure" them against liability with the company's own
money (even if held in a different corporate pocket), on terms they
could never obtain in arms-length negotiations with a true, independent
insurance company. This weakening of the legal protections afforded to
noncontrolling corporate investors should strike particularly hard at minority investors in closely-held companies, for it is much more important
for them than for investors in publicly-traded corporations to have some
means of forcing the issuing company (or its controlling persons) either
to provide them some reasonable share of corporate revenue, or to
liquidate their investments. Minimizing the prospect of true personal
liability for the controlling persons of an issuing company is likely to
minimize the minority investors' leverage in any buy-out negotiations
with these persons. Although the arrangements in the statute do not
appear absolutely foolproof for protecting a company's controlling persons (a court hostile to the provisions could interpret the term "insurance" strictly or the term "actual fraud" liberally), they should still
strengthen the controller's hand considerably by creating a whole new

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. The provision says that the corporation may "create a trust fund or other form
of self-insurance arrangement," and that the provisions of Insurance Code do not apply
to "a wholly-owned subsidiary" that issues the type of self-insurance permitted by the
new act. Id.
149. The subsidiary might loan back to the parent the funds used to capitalize it, and
might arrange a line of credit with the parent so that it could borrow the funds necessary
to pay its insurance-related obligations.
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set of issues to litigate, and by giving him a good chance of prevailing
on these new issues.
It is noteworthy that Act 561 added a retroactivity provision, subsection G, to Louisiana Revised Statutes 12:83. The effect of this provision is to validate "insurance" arrangements made before the enactment
of Act 561, as long as they are "not inconsistent" with Section 83 as
amended. This suggests that the act was custom-designed, and that it
was not simply a thoughtful solution to a widely-perceived social problem.150 One has to wonder whether the legislature really understood that,
in a roundabout way it was eliminating derivative suit exposure for
those controlling persons of Louisiana corporations willing to cause the
companies they run to spend the money necessary to set up the right
kind of "self-insurance" fund. It is difficult to see what social purpose
is advanced by effecting this elimination of liability, conditioned only
on the empty formalism of creating a separate, but controlled and
unregulated "insurance" fund. Had the legislature really intended to
eliminate derivative suit liability, a more direct mechanism could surely
have been devised.

150. Wembley, 490 So. 2d 1107, does not seem to have been the impetus for the new
act, for the act's changes in the standard of conduct would not have helped the Wembley
defendants, who were charged with intentional misconduct, and not with mere negligence.

